Time Barred Debt in Chapter 13

Debts that are past the statute of limitations are considered time-barred debts. The following case law  sho0ws that time-barred debts are not allowed in the Eleventh Circuit, which is Florida’s Circuit.

Crawford v. LVNV Funding LLC  785 F3d 1254 (11th Cir. July 10,2014) 

Proof of claim was filed on a time-barred debt in Chapter 13. this was a violation of  1692e- which prohibits  ” any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt” and Section 1692f which prohibits a debt collector from using ” unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”

Creditors filing bankruptcy proofs of claims will now be subject to the FDCPA, at least in the Eleventh Circuit, but there is renewed hope for certain defenses, such as the litigation privilege.

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15631228362360253615&q=Crawford+v.+LVNV+Funding+LLC++785+F3d+1254+&hl=en&as_sdt=40006

Bazemore v Jefferson Capital Systems LLC  (SD Georgia, May 15,2015)

Jefferson motion to enforce arbitration was ruled groundless  with regards to the FDCPA claim.

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10648902652621483690&q=Crawford+v.+LVNV+Funding+LLC++785+F3d+1254+&hl=en&as_sdt=40006

Carol A. Lawson, Esq., 28870 U.S. Hwy19 #300, Hodusa Towers, Clearwater, FL 33761             Phone: (727) 410-2705;   email: calh@gate.net

SD FL Confirms Communications Sent Only to Debtor’s Counsel Not Actionable Under FDCPA

In Maignan v. Seterus, Inc., No. 14-CV-22488 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 11, 2015), the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida found that an allegedly deceptive communication to a plaintiff’s attorney, as opposed to the plaintiff himself, is not actionable under either the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) or its state counterpart, the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA).  

The action was dismissed  with prejudice a borrower’s action under both the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(e)(2) and (f)(1) (“FDCPA”) and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) (“FCCPA”), confirming that communications directly solely to a debtor’s attorney are not actionable.

The Eleventh Circuit’s “least sophisticated consumer” test, a communication might violate the FDCPA if the language used by the debt collector tends to mislead the least sophisticated recipients of a debt collector’s letters and telephone calls does not apply to attorneys for borrower.

Order and Opinion (11Feb15) – Dismissal w Prejudice

Carol A. Lawson, Esq., 28870 U.S. Hwy19 #300, Hodusa Towers, Clearwater, FL 33761             Phone: (727) 410-2705;   email: calh@gate.net

 

FL (2nd DCA) Reverses Foreclosure Judgment Due to Inadequate Proof of Amount Due, But Remands Without Involuntary Dismissal

2nd DCA reversed a final judgment of foreclosure, holding that the mortgagee failed to properly establish the amount of its damages. the court, however, affirmed State Farm had established its standing as the holder of the note and mortgage, and the default of the mortgagor/borrower under the note.  The borrower failed to move for dismissal at the close of evidence, the proper remedy was reversal and remand, rather than involuntary dismissal.

Colson v. State Farm and Wachovia

http://www.2dca.org/opinions/Opinion_Pages/Opinion_Pages_2015/April/April%2015,%202015/2D13-5526.pdf

Carol A. Lawson, Esq., 28870 U.S. Hwy19 #300, Hodusa Towers, Clearwater, FL 33761             Phone: (727) 410-2705;   email: calh@gate.net

Bank of America v Caulkett

Bank of America v. Caulkett (March 24 US Supreme Court Hearing) — A complex bankruptcy issue: When there are multiple liens on a property, can the debtor “strip off” junior mortgage liens if the debt owed a senior lien holder exceeds the value of the property? (Bank of America v. Toledo-Cardona also deals with the same issue and will be heard on the same day.)

 

 

Carol A. Lawson, Esq., 28870 U.S. Hwy19 #300, Hodusa Towers, Clearwater, FL 33761             Phone: (727) 410-2705;   email: calh@gate.net

FL App Ct (4th DCA) Reverses Dismissal of Foreclosure Based on Missing Original Note

The District Court of Appeals of the State of Florida, Fourth District, reversed the involuntary dismissal of a bank’s mortgage foreclosure action.

The bank filed the original promissory note prior to trial, but at trial the parties discovered that it was missing from the court file. The bank tried to introduce a copy into evidence, but the borrowers objected on the basis of the “best evidence” rule. The clerk of court later found the original note and mailed it back to the bank, which then moved for rehearing or a new trial. The trial court denied the motion and entered final judgment for the borrowers.

On appeal, the Appellate Court analyzed the text of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(b), which governs involuntary dismissal in bench trials, pointing out that Florida courts have interpreted the rule as preventing a trial court from involuntarily dismissing a case before the plaintiff rests the case which is what was done by the lower court.

Carol A. Lawson, Esq., 28870 U.S. Hwy19 #300, Hodusa Towers, Clearwater, FL 33761             Phone: (727) 410-2705;   email: calh@gate.net

http://www.4dca.org/opinions/Jan%202015/01-28-15/4D13-3654.op.pdf   

Fair Debt Collection Act and Offer of Setttlement

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a settlement offer for alleged violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act does not deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction due to mootness, if the settlement offer does not also include an offer of judgment.    
 

Carol A. Lawson, Esq., 28870 U.S. Hwy19 #300, Hodusa Towers, Clearwater, FL 33761             Phone: (727) 410-2705;   email: calh@gate.net

U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to Review Florida Chapter 7 Lien Strip Cases

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed earlier this week that it would hear the cases of Bank of America v. Caulkett and Bank of America v. Toledo-Cardona following the bank’s appeal in both cases, which were both decided in favor of the homeowners by the 11th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals back in May. The Supreme Court said in granting the petition on Monday that it would consolidate the two cases and allot one hour for oral arguments.

This is not good for chapter 7 debtors in Alabama, Georgia, or Florida because the Supreme Court might disagree with Eleventh Circuit decisions that currently allow lien strips in chapter 7 cases. An unfavorable decision could potentially invalidate numerous previous lien strips in chapter 7 cases in these states.

The 1992 case of Dewsnup will be clarified. Is there a distinction between strip offs and strip downs in Ch. 7 as the 11th Circuit believes, or not?  Stay Tuned.

 

False Claim under FDCPA

The Eleventh Circuit held that debtors’ complaint stated a false representation claim under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, where the debt validation/1692g notice identified the loan servicer who started servicing the loan after it was in default as the creditor.”

The Lender transferred the serving rights to the mortgage and note. The Loan Servicer hired a law firm to foreclose. The law firm sent a notice to the Debtor stating that the notice was being sent pursuant to the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) to collect on the debt. The notice also identified the loan servicer as the creditor on the loan.

The Debtor filed suit against the Law Firm in federal district court, claiming that the notice sent to him by the Law Firm violated Section 1692e of the FDCPA by falsely representing that the loan servicer was the creditor on the loan. The Debtor claimed that the loan servicer, having been assigned a debt already in default solely for purposes of collecting on the debt, was not a creditor under the FDCPA. The Court found that even if the loan servicer were not a creditor under the FDCPA, it was harmless error to use the term with respect to the servicer, because the loan servicer had the authority to foreclose and otherwise act as the creditor on the loan. See 15 U.S.C. § §1692a(40; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692g(a)(2), 1692k(a).

However, the Court found that the Debtor’s complaint contained allegations as to the date of default, that the debt was assigned to the loan servicer after the default, thus the law firm violated the FDCPA by falsely identifying the loan servicer as the creditor in its debt collection notice.

Carol A. Lawson, Esq., 28870 U.S. Hwy19 #300, Hodusa Towers, Clearwater, FL 33761             Phone: (727) 410-2705;   email: calh@gate.net

SUE OR BE SUED CLAUSE

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals  held that Federal National Mortgage Association’s (“Fannie Mae”) federal corporate charter confers federal question jurisdiction over claims brought by or against Fannie Mae.

The Ninth Circuit  held that under the rule announced in American National Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247 (1992), Fannie Mae’s federal charter confers federal question jurisdiction over claims brought by or against Fannie Mae. The sue-and-be-sued clause in Fannie Mae’s charter authorizes Fannie Mae “to sue and be sued, and to complain and to defend, in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal.” 12 U.S.C. §1723a(a).

 

Carol A. Lawson, Esq., 28870 U.S. Hwy19 #300, Hodusa Towers, Clearwater, FL 33761             Phone: (727) 410-2705;   email: calh@gate.net

Case Law Update PT II

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Unrue v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., — So.3d —-, 2014 WL 4648205 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).

 

A court must allow at least one attempt at amendment of a quiet title counterclaim to a mortgage foreclosure; Badgley v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 134 So.3d 559, 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014), is distinguished because the Badgley dismissal was of amended complaint.

 

 

 

Handel v. Nevel, — So.3d —-, 2014 WL 4627765 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

 

Failure to check emailed proposed orders which purportedly misstate a trial court ruling does not constitute excusable neglect under Rule of Procedure 1.540.

 

 

 

Ledo v. Seavie Resources, LLC, — So.3d —-, 2014 WL 4628549 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014).

 

Striking of pro se pleadings is examined under the Ham v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492/Mercer v. Raine, 443 So.2d 944 (Fla.1983), analysis instead of the Kozel factors. Consistently failing to respond to discovery despite repeated court orders to do so satisfies the Ham/Mercer requirement for striking pro se pleadings.

 

 

 

Pennington v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, — So.3d —-, 2014 WL 4629173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

 

The assignment of a mortgage does not necessarily assign or transfer the note.

 

 

 

Sto Corp. v. Greenhut Const. Co., Inc., — So.3d —-, 2014 WL 4629200 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

 

Certiorari review is generally not available for orders striking pleadings for discovery violations unless the order results in a “cat out of the bag” scenario or effectively punishes a party in a manner that is not remediable by plenary appeal.

 

Carol A. Lawson, Esq., 28870 U.S. Hwy19 #300, Hodusa Towers, Clearwater, FL 33761             Phone: (727) 410-2705;   email: calh@gate.net